The political choices of Hong Kong residents are limited by an electoral system that ensures the dominance of pro-Beijing camp by stifling prodemocracy opposition. The banning of the proindependence Hong Kong National Party in 2018 marked the first blanket prohibition of a political party since the territory’s 1997 handover from the United Kingdom to China. The government has since taken even more aggressive steps to outlaw prodemocracy political activities.
The largest pro-Beijing party is the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong. The pro-Beijing Bauhinia Party caters to mainland Chinese who have relocated to Hong Kong. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is not formally registered in Hong Kong but exercises enormous influence.
Since 2021, leading prodemocracy figures have been effectively removed from the political arena under provisions of Beijing’s “patriots only” electoral makeover or via the NSL. Civic Passion, a localist party critical of Beijing, disbanded that year after its chairman was ejected from the LegCo; he had failed to clear the EC’s vetting for patriotism. In December 2022, the chairman of the prodemocracy Civic Party said it would dissolve after no party member made a nomination to join its executive committee.
Prodemocracy legislators, who have historically enjoyed substantial minority representation alongside their pro-Beijing counterparts, are absent from the LegCo today.
The subjective nature of the NPC’s standards for oath taking, the expansive criminalization of speech and political activity under the NSL, and the chief executive’s discretionary authority to remove proindependence LegCo members under the NPC’s 2020 directive all invite arbitrary enforcement and pose serious obstacles for the opposition in future elections. The opposition has been battered by arrests and detentions since the 2020 imposition of the NSL.
The 2021 electoral reforms closed remaining avenues for the opposition to win political representation by reducing the number of elected seats, increasing the proportion of appointed seats, and implementing a vetting process to ensure that only “patriotic” candidates who accept Beijing’s rules for Hong Kong can contest elections. Pro-Beijing candidates effectively swept that year’s LegCo elections, leaving the body with no prodemocracy bloc.
The unelected CCP leadership in Beijing exerts a powerful influence on politics in Hong Kong through a variety of channels, including the NPC’s ability to issue interpretations of the Basic Law, the co-optation of Hong Kong business leaders through their mainland assets and membership in the NPC or CPPCC, and lobbying or harassment of election committee members and other political figures to ensure favorable electoral outcomes. The NSL, imposed without consultation by the central government, gives Beijing vastly expanded powers in Hong Kong, in part by establishing a centrally controlled security apparatus in the territory and by allowing defendants in some NSL cases to be transferred to the mainland for prosecution and punishment.
While there are no formal restrictions preventing women or members of ethnic minority groups from voting or running for office, their participation is limited in practice. Of the 21 official members of the Executive Council, a body that advises the chief executive, only 5 are women, and female legislators only occupy 16 of the LegCo’s 90 seats. There is no ethnic minority representation in either branch of government.